We analyse the role of mass violent conflict in influencing individual expectations. We hypothesise that individuals are likely to report negative expectations if they were exposed to conflict events in the past. We combine individual and household level data from the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey of 2007 with a disaggregated conflict exposure index based on the Armed Conflict Locations Events Data (ACLED). We run logistic regression models to study the strength of the association between conflict and expectations. Results indicate that conflict intensity is correlated with a decrease in the probability of expecting economic recovery. The effect of conflict on general welfare however is less robust.
Introduction
This study examines the legacy of mass violent conflict (also called war or conflict below) on expectations. Expectations are fundamental for understanding individual behaviour. These pertain to views held by individuals regarding the future state of variables (Coyne, 2009 ).
Most progress in expectations literature largely explores its influence on a number of outcomes such as; realised income (Dominitz, 1996) , mortality (Hurd and McGarry, 1997) , consumption growth (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2000) , future job losses (Stephens, 2004) , demand for schooling (Willis and Rosen, 1979) , and choice of contraceptive methods (Delavande, 2008) . Results reveal that subjective expectations play an instrumental role in influencing the direction of these outcomes. Another stream of literature (e.g. Akwara et al., 2003; Delavande and Kohler, 2009; Kates 1971; Taylor et al., 1988) studies the drivers of these expectations, underscoring the role of household and community-level factors. This literature overlooks the effect of mass violent conflict on expectations. A few existing studies analyse conflict from the perspective of happiness (Welch, 2008) and preferences (Voors et al., 2010) . Insights into the link between conflict and expectations could be important in the design of effective interventions.
The experience of violent conflict and its legacy in the post-war period may influence the way individuals perceive the environment in which they live, and also shed light on what they expect their future wellbeing to be. Civil war affects individuals differently depending on their characteristics and circumstances (Verwimp et al., 2009 ). Even after war ends, individual expectations may take a variety of courses. On one hand, improved security and post-conflict development aid may permit war-affected individuals to rebuild assets and livelihoods, hence catching up with non-war affected individuals. Individuals benefiting from recovery are likely to be optimistic about future welfare. On the other hand, some individuals or communities may remain engulfed in the "conflict trap" (Collier et al., 2003) , due to loss or displacement of human capital, severe damage of property and infrastructure, as well as continued insecurity. This might yield pessimistic expectations at the individual level. Overall it is likely that individuals will report varied expectations depending on their degree of exposure to conflict, even when they posses otherwise similar traits. Hence, in this paper, we posit that greater exposure to conflict adversely affects individual expectations. We draw on recent evidence from the early post-war period in Northern Uganda to test our hypothesis.
We find that individual expectations of future economic circumstances are negatively affected by past and recent conflict experiences whereas the effect of conflict on general welfare is less robust. Our contribution to literature is that we provide the first attempt to examine how conflict influences individual expectations.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we provide a brief account of the situation in northern Uganda. The third section highlights the data sources and empirical approach used. In section 4 we present statistical insights and econometric results of the study. We then provide a discussion of results and conclusions in sections 5 and 6 respectively.
2.
The case of Northern Uganda constant fear of attacks and abduction; and disruption in family and social cohesion (Baines et al., 2006; IRC, 2006) , to name a few effects.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the region did not register any major improvement in economic wellbeing during the 1990s even as most parts of Uganda experienced benefits of growth. The proportion of people living below poverty line fell from 72% in 1992 to 60% in 1997/98 and rose to 64% in 2000 (GoU, 2004) , diverging from the stronger poverty reduction trends experienced elsewhere in Uganda. The northern region is home of 20% of the total population with an average household size of 5.2 persons. The literacy rate is about 54%, which is lower than the national average of 68%. It comprises of a high proportion of inactive working-age population, with households mainly relying on transfers from relief agencies as the main source of income (UBoS, 2006a) . Participation in income generating activities is constrained by factors such as closure of active markets, difficulties in accessing credit, loss of skills, and poor access to land due to the forceful relocation of households to camps (DANIDA, 2005; UBoS 2006b ). Loss of income and productive assets by over 80% of households during the war also complicated efforts to restore livelihoods (Pham et al., 2007) .
Even when other dimensions of wellbeing are considered, the region still performs poorly compared to the rest of the country. For instance, the infant mortality rate is 20% higher than the national average (UBoS 2006b). Service delivery remains poor as a result of closure of schools and health facilities with the cost of delivery continually on the rise. As the region emerges from a challenging period of violent conflict and deterioration of family, tradition, livelihoods, and cultural solidarity, the prospect of improved welfare in the recovery period remains uncertain.
Data and estimation approach
We use two unique data sources. First, the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey ( ii) How do you expect life to be one year from now? for which responses were: "Better than now", "Same quality", "Worse than now" and "Don't know".
We estimate Logit models in which the above variables are expressed in binary form with, "Yes"=1 and ("No" or "Don't Know")=0 for the first question and "Better"= 1 and ("Same quality", "worse" or "Don't know")=0 in the second. 6 Our model is specified as: This is also expressed in degrees. Aggregating events in a given year, the index for a given location (1) can be defined as:
where d is the distance between an "event" and the location of the household at certain point in time, given as:
The data is freely accessible at: http://www.acleddata.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=3
We parametrise g(.) as ( ) exp( ) g x x α = − , which discounts an event by its distance from a given household. These events are therefore weighted depending on how close they are from the respective individuals or households.
Control variables
We construct four age categories for individuals aged 18 and above. These include 18-28, 29-39, 40-50 and above 50 years. Our intention here is to investigate how expectations might vary across individuals in different age groups, as identified in the literature (Fourati and O'Donoghue, 2009; Kleinjans and Jinkook, 2006; Tepe, 2006) . We also construct an "experience" variable indicating the number of income generating skills an individual posses and when they last applied them. The more recent that an individual applied their skills, the more likely they expect an improvement in welfare. On the other hand frustration might result from having no skills or spending a long time without applying them (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Hayo, 2006) . The index of assets owned by a household is also included.
Accumulation of assets can significantly impact how individuals value their future wellbeing (Zhan, 2005) . We further calculate the number of services the household has access to.
Presence of services such as health facilities, water points, and education in camps, or the services where the household plans to relocate during camp decongestion, may yield optimism about future welfare. Other covariates include the number of properties in the new settlement (such as houses and land), literacy, gender, household size, dependence ratio, presence of individuals with prolonged illnesses, and the gender of household head.
Results

Sample characteristics
The survey observations are representative for all age groups. The majority of respondents (52.5%) expect the general welfare to improve in the next year. More than 50% of the individuals are sceptical about the status of their economic situation in the future ( Table 1) .
Men are more optimistic than women about their future economic status as well as general wellbeing, although the difference is not highly marked ( Table 2) . With regard to literacy, 53% of literate individuals are optimistic about improvement in their economic wellbeing with a higher proportion (57.5%) expecting general welfare to improve. In contrast, the majority of illiterate individuals expect neither their own economic wellbeing nor general welfare to improve. People 50 and older are the least optimistic when compared to other age groups.
Regression results
We three regressions using different specifications for each expectation. Specifically we include i) individual-specific and household characteristics; ii) household welfare variables; and iii) community-level variables. All specifications include district fixed effects to control for unobservable characteristics at the district level.
In Table We next turn to the association between conflict and general life expectations ( Table 3, Model 2). Consistent with the overall argument in the preceding discussion, results suggest that the probability of being less optimistic about wellbeing in future increases with exposure to conflict. The introduction of more specifications does not affect the direction of the coefficient of conflict but rather the association becomes stronger (at 5%). Focusing on the index for 2002, the signs of the coefficients are different for the two models. While it appears positive for economic expectations, we see the reverse in the general welfare model (model 2).
Just as in model 1 we find that the probability an individual expects improvement in welfare is positively related to camp service access, expected place of relocation, and the number of assets. The coefficient for those older than 50 is consistent with the results of economic expectations, but the level of significance declines with more specifications. Whereas the coefficient for household size is not significant for model 1, in this model it is positive and significant (1%) across specifications. Having experience and currently practicing in more activities yields optimism. Nonetheless, the longer somebody goes without using their skills, the more pessimistic they are likely to be. Coefficients for the number of services in the camps, the number of services in the expected settlement, and the number of properties owned are also significant and positive.
Discussion of results
The regression results for model 1 confirm our hypothesis that recent exposure to conflict yields pessimism about future economic wellbeing. However, the positive coefficient for 2002 reveals that individuals may be able to adapt to conflict effects with time, that is, optimistic patterns can emerge with reductions in conflict intensity, even if the initial level of conflict exposure was high. We identify opposite results for the effect of conflict in the two models.
A probable explanation here could be that the economic situation may improve faster than general life. General life may reflect also the prospects of peers and neighbours as well as the effects of health and psychological stress. In short, economic prospects after war alone may improve faster and also be less tied to war legacies than general prospects.
Greater optimism among individuals in their 30s, relative to the young, could be a cohort effects from war. The survey of war affected (Baines et al., 2006) notes that the youth basically grew up in camps, lost education opportunities, and other aspects of meaningful life.
These negative experiences erode their capacity, as a cohort, to benefit from the peaceful environment and recovery programs. With over 15% of the individuals in the survey falling into this category, it poses a challenge to policy makers when it comes to designing effective all-inclusive recovery programs. Individuals older than 50 are less optimistic than the youth. This is expected, given the trauma caused by loss of property and livelihoods. Rebuilding livelihoods takes a long time and might not be satisfactory for those who feel there is not much time left to live.
There is no doubt that literacy plays a key role in informing individual behavior and in influencing the direction of expectations. The probability of expecting a better economic situation is greater for literate individuals than the illiterate. Benefits of literacy for individuals are both direct and indirect. It is associated with sustaining opportunities that allow people to improve their livelihood capabilities and can enable them to tap from existing recovery initiatives. The role of household assets cannot be underestimated either. Results also indicate that households with more assets have a higher probability of expecting a better economic situation than those with few or no assets. The command over assets can create a wide range of positive effects beyond consumption. For instance asset accumulation may improve positive attitudes and behavior as well as enhancing future orientation (Sherraden, 1991; Zhan, 2005) .
The probability of expecting better wellbeing also increases with household size and seems to matter for general expectations. This is probably because of guaranteed security on regaining control over assets during resettlement and the possibility of accessing a greater share of land belonging to the lineage or clan. On the other hand, fragmented households, mostly headed by widows and the elderly, might lose the hope of attaining a relatively decent life.
Households headed by women face a host of challenges in camp. They are economically less empowered, as access to economic resources is not guaranteed to them as opposed to maleheaded households. Customary law protects them, but only to a certain point. In Acholi culture, for instance, widows have no ownership rights for land (Hertz et al, 2007) . They also tend to face challenges accessing the labor that can aid them in both income generation and resettlement. These, among other challenges, create uncertainty about their future welfare.
Our analysis is not free of limitations. We can only analyze expectations at one point in time.
Due to the absence of a panel survey, we are unable to track changes in expectations over time. Second, we do not quantify the levels of expectations. Constructing an index would provide a better picture about the nature of different levels of expectations in the face of conflict.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the role of recent conflict for individual expectations. 
